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SURVEY OF NEW YORK PRACTICE
derivative action attaches whenever the corporation, had it been suing
in its own right, would be entitled to one. Inasmuch as plaintiff did
not request the unique remedies afforded by equity for fraud -e.g.,
rescission, an accounting or a constructive trust - but, in fact, his in-
terest lay only in securing a money judgment, the court concluded that
the action was at law, triable by a jury as a matter of right.
The Supreme Court of the United States recently dealt with the
same issue in Ross v. Bernhard. 12 In determining that a jury trial was
mandated by the seventh amendment, the Court stated that
legal claims are not magically converted into equitable issues by
their presentation to a court of equity in a derivative suit ...
The heart of the action is the corporate claim. If it presents a
legal issue . .. the right to a jury is not forfeited merely because
the stockholder's right to sue must first be adjudicated as an equi-
table issue triable to the court .... 122
Ross and Fedoryszyn represent a sharp break with precedent. 123
By postulating a "nature of the claim" criterion, both decisions recog-
nize that the stockholder is standing in the shoes of the corporation and
that the mere denomination "derivative action" should not foreclose a
party's right to a jury trial when legal relief is sought. It is no longer
feasible to maintain to the contrary, i.e., that actions to recover money
damages are like chameleons taking their color from surrounding cir-
cumstances. 2 4
ARTICLE 52-ENFORCEMENT OF MONEY JUDGMENTS
CPLR 5231: Employer estopped by failure to promptly object to im-
properly served income execution.
If a judgment debtor fails to pay installments pursuant to an
income execution125 or if the sheriff is unable to serve him there-
with,'126 a copy of the income execution may be served upon the
debtor's employer 27 who then has a duty to withhold 10 percent of
121 396 US. 531 (1970).
122 1d. at 538-39, citing Fleitmann v. Welsbach St. Lighting Co., 240 U.S. 27 (1916).
123 See, e.g., Goetz v. Manufacturers & Traders Trust Co., 154 Misc. 733, 277 N.Y.S.
802 (Sup. Ct. Erie County 1935); ef. Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541
(1949). Compare 5 J. MooRE, FEDERAL PRAcricE 38.38 (4) (2d ed. 1969) with C. WIGHT,
FEDERAL CouRTS 320 (2d ed. 1970).
124 Ross v. Bernhard, 396 US. 550 (1970) (dissenting opinion).
125 The machinery in CPLR 5231 was established to avoid harassment of the judg-
ment debtor who is willing to make regular installment payments to satisfy a judgment.
6 WK&M 5231.02.
128 The failure-of-service provision is not limited to situations wherein the judgment
debtor is not a resident of or employed in the proper county for service; it covers any
situation in which the judgment debtor cannot be located. Id. 5231.18.
127 CPLR 5231(d).
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the debtor's salary or incur personal liability for the amount not with-
held during the course of the debtor's employment.128 In Vista Sales
Corp. v. Briggsford Corp. 29 a special proceeding was commenced to
recover accrued installments which the employer had neglected to
withhold. In opposition, the employer asserted that the income execu-
tion was ineffective because it was not served in the same manner as a
summons. 3 0 Recognizing the soundness of the objection, the court
nonetheless ruled that it was waived by respondent's failure to raise
it as an affirmative defense. 131 Moreover, the employer was estopped
from objecting to the mode of service because it had lulled the judg-
ment creditor into a sense of security by making some weekly payments.
Vista is not the first case to hold that in certain circumstances the
employer may be estopped from contending that service was im-
proper.13 2 Thus, the recipient of an income execution should not wait
until an enforcement proceeding is commenced to raise the objection.
Instead, the employer would be well advised to move for a protective
order under GPLR 5240 as soon as possible. But, if, as in Vista, the
employer does not promptly object, should he be allowed to make
some payments, thereby waving the rights of the judgment debtor?138
At first glance, it would seem that a debtor who has been given an op-
portunity to satisfy the judgment has no cause to complain. Yet CPLR
5231 embraces a very delicate subject inasmuch as wages are considered
a special type of property requiring stricter vigilance. 134 Moreover,
despite the fact that the judgment debtor has already been afforded a
hearing, there is an indication that post-judgment income execution
will be reviewed as cautiously as pre-judgment garnishment. 3 5 Fore-
128 See Royal Business Funds Corp. v. Rooster Plastics, Inc., 53 Misc. 2d 181, 278
N.Y.S.2d 350 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1967).
129 63 Misc. 2d 196, 311 N.Y.S.2d 85 (N.Y.C. Civ. Ct. N.Y. County 1970).
130 Service in Vista was effected by registered mail which is clearly improper. Cf. Tri-
angle Publications, Inc. v. Worth Advertising Agency Co., 200 Misc. 671, 103 N.Y.S.2d 714
(N.Y.C. Munic. Ct. 1951) ("presentation" not equivalent to mandate of personal service).
131 CPLR 320(b).
132 See Spatz Furniture Corp. v. Lee Letter Serv., Inc., 52 Misc. 2d 291, 276 N.Y.S.2d
219 (N.Y.C. Civ. Ct. N.Y. County 1966).
133 Recognizing, as one must, that the improper service in Vista could be easily cured
by serving another income execution on the employer, it is nonetheless submitted that
no degree of harm to the debtor can be considered de minimis in view of the fact that
wages are a special type of property and that the implications and utility of wage gar-
nishment have become the subject of critical study. For a collection of cases and articles
evidencing an anti-garnishment tenor, see SociAL JusTicE TnROUGH LmW 136-70 (H. Sem-
mel ed. 1970).
134 Sniadach v. Family Fin. Corp., 395 U.S. 337 (1969), rev'g 37 Wis. 2d 163, 154 N.W.
2d 259 (1967).
135 Compare Endicott Johnson v. Encyclopedia Press, Inc., 226 US. 285 (1924) with
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seeably, the employer who receives an income execution may soon bear
the dual responsibility of protecting the rights of the judgment debtor
as well as his own.
ARTICLE 75 - ARBITRATION
CPLR 7502(b): Federal arbitration in the state courts -Prima Paint,
Erie & Rederi.
In Prima Paint v. Flood & Conklin Manufacturing Co.,'130 the
United States Supreme Court held that in a federal court action the
Federal Arbitration Act137 is controlling if the contract in question
involves interstate or maritime commerce. Because of the constant
reference to the procedure to be followed by the federal courts in
Prima Paint, there was some question as to whether state courts 38 -were
also bound to apply the federal arbitration statute in similar circum-
stances. 139 And, although it had been established that state law
governed in the converse situation, i.e., when an action involving an
intrastate transaction was brought in the federal courts, 140 a definitive
statement regarding the scope of Prima Paint in New York was lacking
until the recent Court of Appeals decision in Ludwig Mowinckels
Rederi v. Dow Chemical Co.141
The contract in Rederi contained a broad arbitration clause
Sniadach v. Family Fin. Corp., 395 U.S. 337 (1969) and Hanner v. DeMarcus, 390 U.S.
736, 741-42 (1968) (dissenting opinion); see also Sweeney, Abolition of Wage Garnishment,
38 F oR HAm L. Rrv. 197 (1969); 162 N.Y.L.J. 7, July 11, 1969, at 1, col. 6.
236 388 U.S. 395 (1967).
187 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-14 (1964).
138 The Federal Arbitration Act is unique in that an independent jurisdictional basis
must be established before the federal courts can take cognizance of the dispute. Indeed,
section 4 of the Act provides that "[a] party aggrieved by the alleged failure, neglect, or
refusal of another to arbitrate ... may petition any United States district court which,
save for such agreement, would have jurisdiction under Title 28." Moreover, it has been
established that the act itself does not afford federal question jurisdiction. Robert Lawrence
Co. v. Devonshire Fabrics, Inc., 271 F.2d 402, 408 (2d Cir. 1959), cert. dismissed, 364 U.S.
801 (1960); Krauss Bros. Lumber Co. v. Louis Bassert & Sons, Inc., 62 F.2d 1004 (2d Cir.
1933). Significantly, there was no doubt in Rederi that the federal courts could have en-
tertained the proceeding since the very transaction which brought the conflict within the
ambit of the federal arbitration statute also provided the federal courts with jurisdiction
under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1964). Nevertheless, there may be numerous instances wherein the
contract involves interstate commerce, but the action must be brought in the state court
because requisite federal jurisdiction, e.g., failure to meet the $10,000 minimum under 28
U.S.C. § 1332 (1964), is lacking. Accordingly, the law that will be applied in the state
courts has enormous practical consequences for the practitioner.
139 See Aksen, Prima Paint v. Flood & Conklin - What Does It Mean?, 43 ST. Jo N's
L. REv. 1, 22-23 (1968); 7B McKaiNEY's CPLR 7501, supp. commentary at 99 (1968).
14o Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co. of America, 350 U.S. 198 (1956).
14125 N.Y.2d 576, 255 N.E2d 774, 307 N.Y.S.2d 660, cert. denied, - U.S. - (1970).
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